The attack surface moved
A year ago an AI agent had a small, fixed set of tools coded into the app. Today it discovers tools at runtime over the Model Context Protocol, pulls reusable skills from public registries, and takes actions on your behalf. Every one of those is a trust boundary, and most are wide open.
This is not theoretical. In the first two months of 2026, researchers filed more than thirty CVEs against MCP servers and clients, 43% of them plain shell injection. An OWASP scan of 3,984 published AI agent skills found that 36.82% carried security flaws. Tool-poisoning attacks succeed at over 84% when auto-approval is on. The security community responded the way it always has, with a shared vocabulary. That vocabulary is OWASP.
Four OWASP lists, one AI agent
ALOS maps its checks to all four. Two are stable and quoted verbatim below; two are still in beta, so we paraphrase rather than misquote.
| LLM Top 10 | Risk |
|---|---|
| LLM01 | Prompt injection |
| LLM02 | Sensitive information disclosure |
| LLM03 | Supply chain |
| LLM04 | Data and model poisoning |
| LLM05 | Improper output handling |
| LLM06 | Excessive agency |
| LLM07 | System prompt leakage |
| LLM08 | Vector and embedding weaknesses |
| LLM09 | Misinformation |
| LLM10 | Unbounded consumption |
| Agentic Skills (AST10) | Risk and severity |
|---|---|
| AST01 | Malicious skills, critical |
| AST02 | Supply chain compromise, critical |
| AST03 | Over-privileged skills, high |
| AST04 | Insecure metadata, high |
| AST05 | Unsafe deserialization, high |
| AST06 | Weak isolation, high |
| AST07 | Update drift, medium |
| AST08 | Poor scanning, medium |
| AST09 | No governance, medium |
| AST10 | Cross-platform reuse, medium |
- Agentic Applications 2026
- Ten risks unique to systems that plan and act: goal hijack, tool misuse, identity and privilege abuse, supply-chain compromise, cascading failures, human-AI agent trust exploitation, and rogue AI agents. Released December 2025.
- MCP Top 10
- Ten risks in the tool-calling protocol: token mismanagement, scope creep, tool poisoning, dependency tampering, command injection, weak authentication, shadow MCP servers, and context over-sharing.
AST10 and the MCP Top 10 are living, beta frameworks. Titles for those two are paraphrased from public drafts, not quoted as final OWASP wording.
What we check before promotion
When a skill or AI agent enters the ALOS library, it runs through a security scan. The skill's source is read, never executed. The output is a risk score plus a list of findings, each tagged to the OWASP categories it touches.
- Package CVE lookup
- Every third-party package a skill declares is checked live against authoritative public vulnerability advisories. Real CVE data, not a guess.
- Static-pattern scan
- The skill's source is read, never executed, and matched against a curated library of threat patterns: prompt-override and text smuggling, hard-coded secrets, sandbox escape, privacy over-reach, and risky system operations. Findings point to the exact line.
- Permission over-reach check
- The tools a skill declares in its manifest are compared against the privacy, secrets and sandbox reach it actually exercises. Anything it touches but never declared becomes its own finding.
- Optional model judge
- On an explicit scan, a model reads the skill and grades its intent risk, catching what pattern-matching misses. It is an opt-in assist, not a hard dependency: the scan stands on its own without it.
The scan informs, other controls enforce
We are deliberate about this: the OWASP scan produces a risk score and findings, but it does not silently block a skill on its own. A score is evidence for a human decision, not a gate that fails closed in the dark. What is actually enforced in the platform is a separate, harder set of controls: only approved models run, irreversible actions never run when they are called, and every call lands on the record.
And the honest boundary: this is automated triage, a static scan plus live CVE data and an optional model judge. It is not a substitute for a full code review, and ALOS attests to its own controls, not to any third-party figure.
The frameworks are moving fast
Three of the four AI agent frameworks were published or revised inside the last twelve months. We track them so the library's checks track them.
- OWASP Top 10 for Agentic Applications 2026
- A peer-reviewed framework for autonomous systems that plan, call tools and act with delegated authority. Built with more than a hundred researchers and a review board including NIST, the Alan Turing Institute, Microsoft's AI Red Team and AWS.
- OWASP MCP Top 10
- OWASP's first Top 10 dedicated to a single protocol surface, the Model Context Protocol. Between January and February 2026, researchers filed more than thirty CVEs against MCP servers and clients; 43% were shell injections.
- OWASP Agentic Skills Top 10 (AST10)
- The skill-content layer: what reusable AI agent skills actually do. Led by Ken Huang. An OWASP scan of 3,984 skills found 36.82% carried security flaws.
- The AI Vulnerability Storm briefing
- SANS, the Cloud Security Alliance and the OWASP GenAI Security Project published an emergency strategy briefing as AI-driven vulnerability discovery compressed exploit timelines from weeks to hours.
